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ABSTRACT: C hina’s rising im portance in the capitalist world- 
econoiny raises questions of world-historic significance. How is 
C hina’s internal social structure likely to evolve as China assumes 
different positions in the existing world system? Will China’s cur­
ren t regim e of accum ulation survive the potential pressures aris­
ing out o f the transform ation? How will o ther peripheral and 
sem i-peripheral states be affected? Can the reem erging China- 
centered  civilization provide solutions to the problem s left be­
hind by U. S. hegemony? If not, how will the rise o f China affect 
the underlying dynamics of the existing world system? The exist­
ing world system may have entered  into a structural crisis. Can 
the system survive the rise o f China? In the age of transition, in­
stead o f expecting the same pattern  of systemic dynamics with 
which we have becom e familiar, it may be m ore appropriate to 
expect bifurcation, chaos, transformations, and the “turns" and 
“tricks" of history.
1. The Rise o f China?
r n i .IE RISE OF CHINA AS A MAJOR PLAYER in the capitalist
world econom y is likely to becom e one of the m ost significant 
.JL. developm ents in the first ha lf of the 21st century. A fter m ore 
than two decades of consistently rapid econom ic growth, in terms of
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Bond, Robert Pollin , Gerald Epstein, James Grotty and Barbara Foley, as well as the anony­
mous referees for their valuable comments and suggestions.
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GDP calculated at purchasing power parity, C hina now accounts for 
12% of world o u tp u t and stands as the second largest econom y in 
the world, behind  the U nited States. In  2002, C hina accounted for 
15% of world econom ic growth and 60% of the world's export growth. 
In  terms o f the world econom y's financial conditions, C hina is now 
the world's largest saver and a m ajor source o f finance for the U. S. 
cu rren t account deficit (Kynge, 2003).
C h ina 's  rising im p o rtan ce  in  the capitalist w orld-econom y 
raises several questions tha t are o f world-historic significance. First, 
there  is the question  how C hina 's  in te rnal social struc tu re  is likely 
to evolve as C hina assumes d ifferen t positions in the existing world 
system, and w hether C hina 's c u rre n t regim e of accum ulation  will 
be able to survive the po ten tia l pressures tha t may arise o u t o f such 
a transform ation .
Second, there is the question: if C hina is “rising,” that is, if it is 
m oving upwards w ithin the hierarchy o f the existing world system, 
how will o th e r peripheral and sem i-peripheral countries be affected? 
Given C hina's enorm ous size, the rise o f C hina canno t b u t have enor­
m ous im plications.
Third, there is the question w hether China will becom e the next 
hegem onic power. If the 20th century was said to be the “American 
Century,” will the 21 st century turn ou t to be the “Chinese Century”? 
Giovanni Arrighi, am ong others, places m uch hope in the renaissance 
of Chinese civilization. Arrighi hopes that a reem erging China-centered 
civilization will provide system-level solutions to the system-level prob­
lems left behind by U. S. hegem ony and lead the transform ation of 
the m odern world into a comm onwealth of civilizations (AS, 1999, 286­
9). Similarly, the Financial Times Special Reports on  Asia begin with 
this form ulation: “Why E urope was the past, the USA is the p resent 
and a China-dom inated Asia the future of the global econom y” (Finan­
cial Times, Septem ber 22, 2003). Will these hopes be realized?
Fourth, there is a m ore fundam ental question. How will the rise 
o f China, and fo r tha t m atter, the rise of Ind ia  as well, affect the 
underlying dynamics of the existing world system itself — the capi­
talist world-economy? Im m anuel W allerstein argues that the existing 
world system has en tered  into a structural crisis. The system has de­
veloped to the po in t a t which several secular trends have now reached 
th e ir respective asym ptotes, exhausting  the system 's space o f self­
adjustm ent. We are now in an  age o f great transition, a t the end of
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which the existing historical system will be replaced by one or sev­
eral o ther systems (W allerstein, 1995; 1996; 1998; 2003).
In  o ther words, we do n o t live in “norm al” times. In  the com ing 
century, instead o f expecting m ore “developm ent,” m ore “m odern­
ization,” m ore upward mobility, m ore o f the same pa tte rn  o f systemic, 
dynamics that we have observed and with which we have becom e fa­
m iliar over the past five or six centuries, it may be m ore appropriate  
to expect m ore bifurcations, m ore chaos, m ore transform ations and 
transitions — in sum, m ore “turns” and “tricks” o f world history.
Therefore, first o f all, it is im portant to place the rise o f China within 
the curren t world-historical conjuncture — the age o f transition.
2. The Age of Transition
In  his debate with R obert B renner, Giovanni Arrighi no ted  two 
crucial differences betw een the late 20th century and the late 19th 
century K ondratieff long waves (Arrighi, 2003). First, w orkers’ strug­
gles played an unpreceden ted  role in  precipitating the dow nturn  in 
the late 20th century. “W hereas in the earlier period the intensifica­
tion o f labor-cap ita l conflicts, and the m ost significant increase in 
real wages, followed the onset o f the dow nturn, in  the second half of 
the tw entieth century they preceded it” (italics in  the orig inal). The 
second difference is the great sou thern  “revolt against the west” in 
the later o f the two periods.
D uring the post-W orld W ar IT “golden age,” the working classes 
in  the core countries m ade unpreceden ted  advances in  living stan­
dards as well as in  social and economic, rights. T he periphera l and 
sem i-peripheral states m ade significant progress in  national develop­
m ent, by pursuing im port substitution, export substitution, or socialist 
industrialization. G overnm ents becam e active and indispensable play­
ers in  capitalist national econom ies. As the bargaining power o f the 
working classes rose and different social groups raised their dem ands 
on  state expenditures, wages and taxes rose m ore rapidly than output. 
By the mid-1960s, worldwide profit rates started to fall and the capital­
ist world-economy entered the downturn o f the curren t Kontratieff long 
wave.
The system’s ru ling elites responded by pursuing a set o f strate­
gies known as neoliberalism. Typical neoliberal policies and institutions 
include “m onetarist” macroeconomic, policies (lowering inflation by
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im posing liigli unem ploym ent), de-regulation, privatization, trade 
and  financial liberalization, and  attacks on  the welfare state. T he 
neoliberal strategy tries to resolve the profitability crisis by underm in ­
ing the bargaining power o f the global working classes and by pursu­
ing reverse redistribution from  the workers to the capitalists, and  from  
the south to the north .
U n d e r neo libera lism , global inequality  has reach ed  u n p rec ­
eden ted  levels. T he incom e gap betw een the richest 20% o f the world 
population  and  the poorest 20% rose from  30:1 in 1960, to 60:1 in 
1990, 74:1 in  1999, and  is projected  to reach  100:1 in  2015 (U nited 
Nations, 2000). Real wages have fallen in many countries (including 
the U nited States), and about 50% of the global non-agricultural labor 
force is estim ated to be e ither unem ployed or under-em ployed (PV,
2001, 24).
As global inequality rises and  the w orking classes in many parts 
o f the world suffer from  absolute pauperization, the purchasing power 
o f the majority o f the population  in the world has tended  to decline 
or stagnate, setting constraints on  the growth o f world consum ption. 
H igh real in terest rates and financial instability have led to slowdown 
in global investm ent (Felix, 2001). Governm ents have mostly pursued 
tight fiscal policies, in  accordance with the in terest o f global finan­
cial capital. As a result, all m ajor com ponents o f global effective de­
m and  —  consum ption , investm ent, and  governm ent spend ing  — 
have tended  to either stagnate, contract, or grow slowly (Crotty, 2000).
T he global econom y has been  moving towards stagnation. The 
world econom ic growth rate declined from  4.9% in 1950-73, to 3.0% 
in 1973-92, and  2.7% in 1990-2001. D uring the 1990s, 52 countries 
suffered from  falling real per capita GDP (U nited Nations, 2002).
T he global economy has been able to avoid a full-scale downward 
spiral only because the world's hegem onic power —  the U. S. economy
—  has m anaged to m aintain huge and rising curren t account deficits, 
pum ping  dem and  into the global economy. However, these deficits 
have led to growing indebtedness against the rest o f the world. This 
raises a m ost interesting question. As U. S. foreign indebtedness ex­
plodes, how long can the U nited  States keep creating “effective de­
m and” simply by prin ting money without eventually underm ining the 
dollar, as well as U. S. hegemony?
W hatever happens to the U. S. cu rren t account deficit and  the 
dollar, a stagnating world economy with increasingly greater inequality
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in  incom e and wealth is hardly a recipe for a stable and sustainable 
world o rder. If the neoliberal regim e does n o t fall apart fo r purely 
econom ic reasons, it is certainly conceivable that it will be tom  apart 
by its own incessant drive towards polarization.1
If the neoliberal regim e turns o u t to be unsustainable, what could 
be the solution? For the world econom y to resum e sustained expan­
sion at a m ore rapid pace, global effective dem and needs to expand 
m ore rapidly in  a m ore stable m anner. For tha t to take place, it is 
likely that the revival o f global mass consum ption would be a neces­
sary condition. A purely investment-led dem and expansion is likely 
to be vulnerable to speculation, bubbles, and financial crises.
W hat institutional changes would be required  for the revival of 
global mass consum ption? O ne possibility is a re tu rn  to social dem o­
cratic Keynesianism. The state would again play an active role in  regu­
lating  and m anaging  the econom y. State m anagem en t and som e 
egalitarian  incom e re-distribution will help  to genera te  conditions 
fo r relatively vigorous expansion o f global mass consum ption. Rul­
ing elites may be u n d er pressure to m ake new “new deals” with the 
working classes in  the core and sem i-peripheral states. These may 
involve revival o f the welfare state, state con tro l over in ternational 
trade and capital flows, state regulation o f labor and environm ental 
standards, public investm ent program s, re-nationalization of “strate­
gic industries” (for exam ple, the telecom m unication industries and 
public utilities), and dem ocratization o f central banks.
W ould this m ean ano ther great “golden age”? Toward the end of 
the last expansion, the bargaining power of the global working classes 
and the popular dem ands on  the state had already reached a po in t 
triggering a global crisis of profitability and accum ulation. If ano ther 
expansion takes place u nder social dem ocratic and Keynesian institu­
tions, it is reasonable to expect tha t the hopes and expectations of 
the working classes will n o t be exactly the same as they were in  1945. 
In stead , they may be a t substantially  h ig h e r  levels. T he  w orking 
classes may soon be able to recover and consolidate all o f th e ir his­
torical social and econom ic rights, and start to dem and  greatly ex­
pand ing  them . T he surge in  wage and taxation costs may soon ru n  
o u t o f control.
1 F o r d e ta iled  d iscussions oil th e  unsustainab ility  oi th e  n eo lib era l g lobal econom y an d  the  
c u r re n t  g lobal eco n o m ic  crisis, see Li, 2003.
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If we look beyond the cyclical patterns of K ondradeff long waves, 
the tendency fo r real wages and taxation to increase may be seen as 
“secular trends” tha t have b een  p resen t th ro u g h o u t die en tire  life 
span o f capitalism (W allerstein, 1998; 2003, 45-68). D evelopm ent of 
the capitalist world-economy has led to urbanization and pro letari­
anization, creating favorable conditions fo r workers to organize. As 
workers' political and econom ic organizadon grows, working classes 
have fought fo r gradual extension o f political, econom ic, and social 
rights. In  the long run , bod i the polidcal strength  and the bargain­
ing power o f the working classes have tended to grow.
As capitalism  develops, all social groups have increased their 
dem ands on  the state. In  the sho rt ru n , governm ent spend ing  on  
social welfare helps to tam e the “dangerous classes” and m ain tain  
political stability. However, in the long run , die extension o f social 
spending raises peoples' expectations, creating m ore pressures on  die 
state, leading to e id ie r rising taxation costs or, as the state fails to m eet 
rising popular dem ands, declining legitimacy.
W allerstein argues that as die secular trends o f rising wage, taxa­
tion, and environm ental costs reach d ieir respective asymptotes, capi­
talism reaches the po in t o f “structural crisis” o r “term inal crisis.” The 
crisis can no longer be resolved w idiin the system's own framework. 
Instead, it will lead to “bifurcation,” and the system is to be replaced 
by one o r several o th er systems (Wallerstein, 1995; 1996; 1998; 2003).
Historically, die capitalist world-economy has been able to postpone 
die structural crisis through geographic expansion. Geographic expan­
sion allows access to new reserves of cheap labor and natural resources, 
prevendng labor and environm ental costs from  rising to die point of 
effectively th rea ten ing  accum ulation. However, the capitalist world- 
economy has now encompassed the entire globe and reached die limit 
of geographic expansion. Any fu rther expansion requires m ore inten­
sive exploitation o f existing reserves o f labor and the environm ent.
In  diis context, populous countries widi large stocks o f cheap labor 
and “under-exploited” natural resources, and u n d e r some degree of 
effecdve governm ent, such as China and India, may turn  ou t to be die 
last and largest reserves for die capitalist world-economy. The “rise of 
China” and “die rise of India,” in diis sense, would represent die final 
exhaustion o f die rem ain ing  reserves. T he dep letion  o f these final 
reserves is likely to drive up  global labo r and env ironm ental costs 
drastically in the first ha lf o f die 21st century.
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In  the age of transition, can the existing world system survive the 
rise o f C hina (and the rise o f India)?
3. The End of Capitalist History?
In  The Long Twentieth Centwy, Giovanni Arrighi argued that the 
expansion of the capitalist world-economy over the past 500 years has 
been  based on  continual recreation  of two underly ing conditions: 
inter-state com petition , and fo rm ation  o f “political structures with 
ever-more extensive and com plex organizational capabilities to con­
trol the social and political environm ent o f capital accum ulation on 
a world scale,” that is, the leading o r hegem onic capitalist states.
All fo u r  sta tes —  V cnicc, th e  U n ite d  P rovinces, th e  U n ite d  K ingdom , an d  
th e  U n ite d  States —  have b e e n  g rea t pow ers o f  th e  successive ep o c h s  d u r ­
in g  w hich  th e ir  ru lin g  g ro u p s  s im u ltaneously  p layed  th e  ro le  o f  le a d e r  in  
p rocesses o f  sta te fo rm a tio n  a n d  o f  cap ita l ac cu m u la tio n . S een  sequentially , 
how ever, th e  fo u r  states a p p e a r  to  have b e e n  g rea t pow ers o f  a very d iffe r­
e n t  a n d  in c re as in g  o rd e r . . . . T h e  m e tro p o lita n  d o m a in  o f  ea ch  sta te in  th is 
se q u en c e  en co m p ass a la rg e r  te rrito ry  a n d  a g re a te r  variety  o f  reso u rces th a n  
th o se  o f  its p red e cesso r. M ore im p o rtan tly , th e  netw orks o f  p o w er a n d  ac­
c u m u la tio n  th a t  e n a b le d  th e  sta tes in  q u es tio n  to  re o rg an iz e  a n d  c o n tro l 
th e  w orld  system  w ith in  w hich  they  o p e ra te d  grew  in  scale a n d  scope as th e  
se q u en c e  p rog resses . (A rrighi, 1994, 14.)
Historically, resolution o f the systemic crisis o f accum ulation has 
involved a change in the leadership  o f the world-scale processes of 
capital accum ulation, on  larger and m ore com prehensive founda­
tions. Arrighi suggests, however, that sooner or later the process m ust 
reach a stage a t which the crisis o f accum ulation can no longer bring 
into existence a state powerful enough to bring  abou t larger and m ore 
com prehensive organizational structures. It seem s th a t we are ap­
proaching such a lim it as the U. S. “systemic cycle o f accum ulation” 
is in decline (as m anifested by the “fm ancialization” of the U. S. econ­
omy since the 1970s), b u t there is no obvious candidate that can realis­
tically hope  to replace the U nited States as the next leadership  o f the 
capitalist world-economy (Arrighi, 1994, 325-6).
A rrighi suggests three possible outcom es o f the cu rren t crisis of 
accum ulation. First, the incum bent hegem ony — the U nited States
— may use its state and war-making capabilities to form  a truly global
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world em pire and  term inate capitalist history. Second, the incum bent 
hegem ony may n o t be able to stop capitalist history, in  which case 
East Asian capital would rise to the com m anding position. However, 
those who occupy this position would lack the necessary state and  war- 
m aking capabilities to appropriate  the large, m onopolistic, “capital­
ist” profits, and  capitalist history would com e to an en d  as the 
“underlying layer o f the m arket econom y” reverted to some k ind of 
anarchic situation. Finally, hum anity may b u rn  up in the horro rs of 
the escalating violence that accom panies the liquidation o f the exist­
ing world o rder, and  capitalist history would end  by reverting per­
m anently to systemic chaos (Arrighi, 1994, 355-6).
In Chaos and Governance in the Modern World. System, Arrighi and 
Silver (AS, 1999, 289) place m uch hope on  the renaissance of Chi­
nese civilization and  the possibility that a reem erging  China-centered 
civilization m ight provide system-level solutions to the problem s left 
b eh ind  by U. S. hegemony:
T h e  m ost severe a m o n g  th ese  p ro b le m s is th e  seem ing ly  u n b rid g e a b le  g u lf  
o f  th e  life-chances o f  a  sm all m in o rity  o f  w o rld  p o p u la tio n  (betw een  10 a n d  
20 p e rc e n t)  a n d  th e  vast m ajority . In o rd e r  to  p ro v id e  a  viable a n d  susta in ­
ab le  so lu tio n  to  th is  p ro b le m , th e  “track lav ing  veh ic les’’ o f  E ast Asia m ust 
o p e n  u p  a  new  p a th  o f  d e v e lo p m e n t fo r  them selves a n d  fo r  th e  w orld  th a t 
d e p a r ts  rad ically  from  th e  o n e  th a t  is now  a t a  d e a d  en d .
In o ther words, in  Arrighi's m ap of scenarios, unless the hope of 
the rise o f C hina (or East Asia) is to m aterialize, hum anity is doom ed 
to the unpleasant choice betw een a global world em pire and  perm a­
n e n t systemic chaos. Can the existing world system (and  hum anity) 
survive w ithout the rise o f China?
The rest o f this paper asks w hether the rise of C hina is likely, and  
explores im plications for the existing world system. Sections 4 and  5 
discuss China's cu rren t position in  the world system, as reflected by 
its status in global com m odity chains and  the global wage hierarchy, 
and  its class structure in com parison to those of states occupying dif­
feren t structural positions in the world system. Section 6 discusses the 
prospect o f the rise o f C hina and  how the global political econom y 
may be transform ed as a result. Tt explores several possible scenarios 
that may unfold in the com ing decades.
A crucial aspect of the structural crisis of the existing world system 
is the deepening global environm ental crisis. It is n o t a t all clear that
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the existing world system will be able to find soludons. H ie  rise of Cliina, 
widi a corresponding expansion of m aterial producdon and consump- 
don, were it n o t to lead to a polidcal-econom ic crisis of die system, may 
very well contribute to systemic chaos by acceleradng the com ing of 
environm ental catastrophe. This possibility is discussed in  Section 7.
Secdon 8 summarizes the alternative historical possibilides that 
confron t hum anity in  the com ing century. Will hum anity end up  liv­
ing u n d e r a global world em pire? O r global chaos? O r an  environ­
mentally sustainable world system that is able to m eet die basic needs 
of everyone on  earth? Ultimately, these questions have to be answered 
by real historical acdons.
4. China in the Capitalist World-Economy
A ccording to W allerstein  (1979; 1994), the capitalist world- 
econom y is a world system with in teg ra ted  division o f labo r and 
m ultiple polidcal structures (states). It first em erged in  Northwest 
E urope in  the 16di century and has since d ien  expanded to include 
the endre  globe.
T he division of labor within die capitalist world-economy results 
in flows of commodides, labor, and capital across different geographic 
areas through  millions of chains of p roducdon  and exchange, each 
stardng widi die inidal producer and ending  widi die final user of a 
product. These chains are referred to as “global commodity chains.”2 
W idiin each commodity chain, a certain am ount of surplus (die differ­
ence between total ou tpu t and die subsistence needs of die producers, 
appearing as a certain am ount of m arket value ) is generated. However, 
typically, the surplus generated is unevenly distributed am ong states. 
D epending on dieir different posidons in sharing of die surplus, states 
are located in  different structural posidons in  the world system (die 
core, die semi-peripliery, and die periphery ) in a hierarchical m anner.
T he surplus generated in com m odity chains is unevenly distrib­
uted am ong states because of d ifferent degrees of relative monopoli- 
zadon at different stages of die commodity chains. Reladve m onopoly 
may be established if certain producers have technical, organizational, 
or political advantages over o th e r p roducers (W allerstein, 1994). 
U neven d istribudon of the surplus implies unequal exchange. The
2 F o r d e ta iled  d iscussions o n  g lobal com m odity  chains, see G ere lli, 1994.
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core states are those that generally benefit from  unequal exchange 
and receive disproportionately greater portions o f the world surplus. 
P roduction in the core zone is characterized by high profit, h igh wage, 
h igh technology, and diversified activities. The peripheral states are 
those that generally suffer from  unequal exchange and receive dis­
proportionately smaller portions of the world surplus. Production in 
the periphery is characterized by low profit, low wage, low technol­
ogy, and less diversified activities (W allerstein, 1979, 97).
T he concept o f semi-periphery is m ore difficult to define. How­
ever, W allerstein believes that sem i-peripheral states are indispens­
able for the political stability o f the capitalistworld-economy. W ithout 
the sem i-peripheral states function ing  as the “m iddle stratum ” in the 
world system, the capitalist world-econom y would becom e highly 
polarized, with a small high-incom e and high-status sector confront­
ing a relatively hom ogeneous low-income and low-status sector includ­
ing the overwhelm ing majority of the population. T he system is likely 
to soon disintegrate as acute struggle takes place am ong highly self­
conscious classes (W allerstein, 1979, 23; 69-73). T he sem i-peripheral 
states therefore include those that can m ost effectively play the role 
o f a politically stabilizing “m iddle stratum .” These roughly correspond 
to the “u pper m iddle-incom e countries” that appear in various con­
ventional econom ic statistics.
W hat is C hina’s cu rren t position in this hierarchy? Consider one 
exam ple o f a global comm odity chain. Table 1 reports the worldwide 
distribution of value added in each stage of p roduction  and distribu­
tion o f a m odel globe for use by children, m ade in C hina to be sold 
in the U. S. m arket. In  this exam ple, China, a periphera l state, re­
ceives 10.5% of the total value added. H ong  Kong, which arguably 
has a sem i-peripheral position in the world system, receives 26.3%. 
The U nited States receives 63.2% of the total value added. Similarly, 
Andy Xie, the M organ Stanley chief econom ist on  Asia, estimates that 
for each U. S. dollar in value o f C hina’s exports to the U nited  States, 
businesses in H ong  Kong or Taiwan take 20 cents, and U. S. b rand 
owners and distributors receive the bulk o f the benefits (Xie, 2003).
T hese exam ples are consistent with w hat is generally observed 
in global com m odity chains.3 Generally, the core states receive the
3 F o r exam ples oi value d istr ib u tio n  in  g lobal com m odity  chains, see Chossudovskv, 1998, 
75-100; M akhijani, 1992, 11-35.
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TABLE 1
The Distribution of Value Added in the Global Commodity Chain 
of Model Globe for C hildren’s Study









Share of the 
total value 
added in the 
com modity 
chain (%)
U.S. retail company 88 16 21.1
U.S. m anufacturing company 72 32 42.1
H ong Kong trade company 40 20 26.3
G uangdong Foreign trade company 20 5 6.6
Jiangsu /  G uangdong producers 15 3 3.9
Primary costs 12 / /
Source: S peech  by Ma Jiantang, D eputy  G enera l S ecretary  o l'C h in a 's  S tate E conom ic an d  T rad e  
C om m ission: “S tra teg ic  Fo rum  ol' T ran sn a tio n a l C o rp o ra tio n s  in  C h in a .” Shijie Ribao (T h e  
W orld Jo u rn a l) . D ecem b er 15. 2002. p. A9.
lio n ’s share, and  the p eriphera l and  sem i-peripheral states receive 
sm aller shares of the m arket value generated .
The value added  received by each state is divided between prof­
its and  wages. To the ex ten t that peripheral and  sem i-peripheral states 
receive sm aller shares of value added, the workers in these states have 
to receive lower wages.4 T herefore, d ifferent wage rates may be used 
to indicate the positions of d ifferent states in the world system, as an 
index of the degrees of unequal exchange. Table 2 reports wage rates 
in the m anufacturing sectors in selected countries. At the top o f the 
h ierarchy are the core states, including the U nited  States, Japan , and  
W estern Europe, accounting fo r abou t 15% of the world population. 
Im m ediately  below the core states are  small states such as South 
Korea, Singapore, H ong  Kong, and  Israel, which function  m ore o r 
less as the core states’ political, econom ic, o r m ilitary bridgeheads 
in the periphery. T heir wage rates are 40-75%  of those o f the core 
states. T he “upper-m iddle-incom e” o r sem i-peripheral states in  Latin 
Am erica, Southeast Asia and  Central Europe, accounting for about 
10% of the w orld popu lation , have wage rates 10-30%  of those of 
the core states. At the bottom  are the periphera l states that account 
fo r the m ajority of the world population. C hina and  Ind ia  are the two
4 E m pirical ev idence  suggests th a t wage shares in  value ad d e d  a re  usually h ig h e r  in  co re  
sta tes th an  in  p e r ip h e ra l o r sem i-p erip h era l sta tes (Chossudovskv, 1998, 80).
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TABLE 2
M anufacturing W orkers' Wage Rates in Selected Countries 
(Average Monthly Wage, 1995, US$)
Countries Monthly Wage As % of U. S. Wage
U nited States 2212.7 100.0
Japan 2964.1 134.0
South Korea 1704.6 77.0
Israel 1611.8 72.8
Singapore 1522.4 68.8





H ungary 314.7 14.2
Poland 278.4 12.6
Philippines 258.8 11.7








•‘1994. ’’B efore th e  peso  d ep rec ia tio n , it was $325.8 (1993). ‘1997.
Source: In te rn a tio n a l L abor O rg an iza tio n . Yearbook o f I.abor Statistics 2000,
G eneva. Sw itzerland. W age rates a re  conv erted  in to  U. S. do llars using the  
average exch an g e  rates in  1995. D ata lo r  ex ch an g e  rates a re  l'rom K conom ic 
In te llig e n c e  U nit a t L o n d o n . II th e  wage ra tes  a re  n o t  sta ted  as m on th ly  
wages, they  a re  co n v e rted  to m o n th ly  wages using  th e  fo llow ing fo rm ula : 
m onth ly  wage = weekly wage x 4.3 = daily w ag e /8  x weekly w orking hou rs x 
4.3 = hourly  wage x weekly w orking hou rs x 4.3.
largest of these. T he wage gap between them  and  the core states is 
between 40:1 and  60:1. Russia used to be one of the m ost powerful 
sem i-peripheral states. A fter m ore than a decade o f “transition ,” it 
has m ade the successful transition to a fully peripheral state.
5. China ’s Class Structure in the Capitalist World Economy
Why are wage rates so d ifferen t across d ifferen t structural posi­
tions in the capitalist world-econom y? T he wage rate, o r  price o f
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labor power, ju s t like the price of any comm odity, is determ ined  by 
“dem and” and “supply.” The question is, what are the social forces 
that act beh ind  and regulate the “dem and” and the “supply.” O n  the 
side of “dem and ,” the system of unequal exchange and the concen­
tration o f the world surplus in  the core set the u pper limits to the 
wage rates in  d ifferen t structural positions in the world system. O n 
the side o f “supply,” the workers' biologically determ ined  subsistence 
needs set the absolute lower limits. However, the real or social lower 
limits are set by class struggle, or the bargaining power of the work­
ing classes.
The w orkers' bargaining power varies under d ifferent forms of 
labor organization. D epending on  how their labor is organized and 
thus their relative bargain ing  power, workers may be divided into 
several sectors: highly skilled “professionals, technicians, and m an­
agers,” fully prole tarianized wage workers, semi-prole tarianized “mi­
gran t workers,” and semi-prole tarianized peasants (Wallerstein, 1979, 
102-3).
Professionals, technicians, and m anagers have, to a certain  de­
gree, m onopolistic control over the supply of their labor power and 
their labor is generally difficult to m onitor. They perform  econom ic 
and social functions that are o f strategic im portance. To secure their 
loyalty, capitalists have to pay these workers a “loyalty ren t,” so that 
their incom es are significantly h igher than  those o f o ther workers. 
To the ex ten t these workers live a relatively privileged m aterial life, 
they constitu te  the “m iddle class” betw een the capitalist class and 
o ther working classes (Wright, 1997, 19-26).
T he fully prole tarianized wage workers are the skilled and semi­
skilled u rban  workers, who usually have full-tim e jobs in  the “for­
m al sector.” T heir m oney incom es derive alm ost entirely from  wage 
labor.
U nskilled u rb an  wage workers, who usually have part-tim e or 
insecure jobs  and are frequently  unem ployed, belong  to the semi­
proletariat. T heir wage incom es are n o t sufficient to m eet essential 
needs and they have to engage in petty m arket transactions or petty 
com m odity production , or work in  the “inform al sector” to supple­
m en t their incomes. In  the periphery and the semi-periphery, many 
sem i-proletarian workers are “m igrant workers” who spend part of 
their time in the u rban  area and the rest in the rural area. A substan­
tial p a rt o f their real incom es com e from  rura l family p roduction .
THE RISE OF CHINA 433
Agricultural petty com m odity producers living in rural areas are 
known as “peasants.” In  the periphery and semi-periphery, peasants 
and sem i-proletarian wage workers often belong to the same house­
holds. Many live as peasants during part o f their lifetime, and vice versa. 
In  the context o f the periphery  and semi-periphery, peasants may be 
seen as “sem i-proletarians” to the ex ten t they function  as the rural 
reserve army of the u rban  unskilled wage workers.
If  we rank different sectors o f the working classes according to 
th e ir bargain ing  power, reflected  by th e ir real incom es, then  the 
professional and m anagerial workers (the m iddle class) are obviously 
a t the top. A m ong the rest, the fully pro letarian ized  wage workers 
(the proletariat) are better educated, m ore effectively organized, have 
stronger bargaining power, and receive h igher real incom es. In  com­
parison to the core states, periphera l and sem i-peripheral states are 
characterized by a sm aller professional sector, a sm aller fully prole- 
tarianized sector, bu t a far larger semi-prole tarianized sector (Waller- 
stein, 1979, 103, 277-8).
Using a variety o f sociological studies, I have constructed  class 
structures fo r the U nited  States, Brazil, and China, as exam ples of 
the core, semi-periphery, and periphery, respectively. T he class struc­
tures o f these states are presented in Table 3. T he detailed procedures 
followed in  this calculation are described in the A ppendix.
From  Table 3, it is clear that as a state moves up in  the hierarchy 
o f the world system, the degree o f proletarianization tends to rise. In 
the U nited States, full-time pro letarian  workers account for n ear half 
o f the total population and all types o f wage workers account fo r about
TABLE 3








Bourgeoisie /  Elite 5 2 3
Middle Class 20 10 9
Petty Bourgeoisie 5 9 4
Proletariat 45 18 12
Semi-Proletariat 25 47 28
Peasants / 12 44
Source. See A pp en d ix .
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90%. T he sem i-peripheral states tend to have a m iddle degree o f 
proletarianization. In  the case o f Brazil, the p ro letaria t accounts for 
nearly 20% of the population, and all wage workers about two-thirds. 
Peripheral states have the lowest level o f proletarianization. In China, 
the pro letaria t accounts for abou t one-ten th  of the total population 
and all wage workers abou t half. A special feature o f the Chinese class 
structure is a large peasant class, constitu ting an enorm ous reserve 
o f cheap labor.
To the ex ten t periphera l states have lower levels o f pro letarian­
ization, workers tend to be less educated, less effectively organized, 
and u n d e r constan t pressure to com pete against a large rural reserve 
army. They therefore tend to have m uch less bargaining pow er and 
receive significantly lower wages. This in tu rn  makes it possible for 
the world surplus to be concentrated  in the core.
Historically, inco rporation  o f new geographic areas with large 
ru ra l labo r forces has played a m ajor role in keep ing  down global 
labor costs. However, in the long run, developm ent of the capitalist 
w orld-econom y has been  associated with the u rban ization  (o r de- 
ruralization) o f the lab o r force. A fter some initial d iso rien tation , 
u rbanized  w orkers have invariably struggled fo r h ig h er degrees of 
organization and extension o f econom ic, social, and political rights. 
T h e ir struggles have led to growing p ro le tarian ization  w ithin the 
capitalist world-econom y (W allerstein, 1983; 1998, 41-2).
6. The Rise o f China and the Transformation o f the Global 
Political Economy: Alternative Scenarios
The world econom y is now in the B-phase, o r the downward stage 
o f the K ondradeff long wave that started in 1945 and peaked during  
1967-1973. D uring  the dow nturn , p ro fit rates in the lead ing  eco­
nom ic sectors decline. For profit rates to recover, it is necessary for 
the core states to establish new leading  sectors (new m onopolies). 
For capital to be shifted from  the declin ing  sectors into the rising 
ones, the declin ing  sectors need  to be re-located from  the core to 
the periphery  o r semi-periphery. Some peripheral o r sem i-peripheral 
countries benefit from  this re-location. Historically, such historical 
m om ents provide opportunities for upward m obility w ithin the sys­
tem  (W allerstein, 1979, 69-73).
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C hina has been  the prim ary beneficiary o f the latest ro und  of 
capital re-location. Since 1993, C hina has consistently been  the larg­
est receiver o f foreign direct investm ent am ong the “developing coun­
tries.” In  2002, C hina overtook the U nited  States to becom e the 
w orld’s largest receiver of foreign direct investment. While in terms 
o f m arket value, C hina only accounts fo r 4% of world GDP and 5% 
of the w orld’s m anufacturing exports, it accounted fo r 15% of world 
GDP growth and 29% of the growth o f world m anufacturing exports 
in 2002.5 Many believe that C hina is set to becom e “the workshop of 
the w orld” in the 21st century.
W hen C hina started  the p ro jec t o f “reform  and openness” to 
d eepen  its inco rporation  in to  the capitalist world-econom y, it had 
basically a class s tructu re  and a level of wages that were those o f a 
periphera l state. O n  the o th e r hand , fo r historical reasons (Maoist 
self-reliance and socialist industrialization), C hina’s econom ic struc­
ture resem bled that o f a sem i-peripheral state. Tt had the com prehen­
sive technological capability to p roduce  a wide variety o f products, 
ranging from  low to h igh value added. T herefore, as soon as C hina 
was “opened ,” it started to engage in full-scale com petition  against 
the established sem i-peripheral states (Lu, 1999). Because of C hina’s 
low wages and low costs, it has been  in a favorable position  in the 
com petition  and has becom e the m ajor receiver o f the capital re­
located ou t o f the core states.
W hat will likely follow from  this? As C hina becom es the cen ter 
o f world m anufacturing  exports, Chinese society is likely to experi­
ence rapid industrialization and urbanization. Tts class structure will 
be fundam entally  transform ed. T he share of p ro le tarian  and semi­
pro letarian  wage workers in the population  will increase substantially, 
and the share o f peasants will fall. W ithin one o r two generations, 
C hina’s degree of proletarianization will reach the cu rren t levels in 
Latin Am erican and Southeast Asian sem i-peripheral states. As a re­
sult, Chinese workers will dem and sem i-peripheral levels of wages and 
the corresponding  political and social rights. T he wage gap between 
the core states and C hina may be reduced from  the p resen t ratio of 
40:1 to around 10:1.
5 Shijie liibao (T h e  W orld Jo u rn a l), D ecem b er 21, 2002, p. AS): The Economist, F eb ruary  20, 
2003.
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T he dem ands and  increased bargain ing  pow er o f workers will 
impose great pressures on  C hina's regim e of capital accum ulation. 
To survive these pressures, C hina m ust establish itself as a stable and 
secure sem i-peripheral state. Given the basic laws of m otion  of the 
capitalist world-economy and  the cu rren t conjuncture, is this likely 
to happen? O ne can im agine fou r possible scenarios.
First, C hina may fail. Its drive toward “developm ent” may tu rn  
o u t in  the en d  to be no  m ore than  a g rea t bubble. As C hina sinks 
back into the periphery, its existing regim e of accum ulation will col­
lapse, unab le  to w ithstand the exp lod ing  social pressures the very 
process of accum ulation has generated.
This scenario, however, may be the least devastating of the four 
possible ones fo r the capitalist world-economy, fo r which the p rob­
lem  of C hina lies with its huge size. C hina has a labor force larger 
than  the total labor force in  all of the core states, o r  in the entire  semi­
periphery. Should China becom e a fully established sem i-peripheral 
state, com peting with the existing sem i-peripheral states in all com­
m odity chains, the com petition  eventually m ust lead to convergence 
betw een C hina and the existing sem i-peripheral states in  profit rates 
and  wage rates. This convergence may take place in an upw ard m an­
n e r  o r a downward m anner.
U nder downward convergence (scenario 2), China's com petition 
will completely underm ine  the relative m onopoly of the existing semi­
periphera l states in certain  com m odity chains. T he value added  will 
be squeezed, forcing the traditional sem i-peripheral states to accept 
lower wage rates close to the Chinese rates.6
In  effect, the second scenario is peripheralization  of the semi­
periphery. This has dangerous im plications fo r the capitalist world- 
econom y. T he sem i-periphery plays the indispensable role o f the 
“m iddle stratum ” in the world system. A layer of the sem i-periphery 
offers hope of “m odernization,” “developm ent,” and  ultimately, up­
6 For the effects of China’s competition on Southeast Asian semi-peripheral states, see Xie 
(2002) and Yam and Xie (YX, 2002). Yam and Xie argue that “China is likely to become 
an international player for an increasing range of products and to move up the value 
chain, , , , The bottom line is that China’s surplus labor is three times the labor force in 
the manufacturing sector of OECD countries, meaning that it can absorb the world’s 
manufacturing sector without causing much wage inflation. In our view, China’s prices 
are becoming global prices, while other Asian producers have to accept prices.” Xie 
maintained that “other East Asian economies can’t maintain the same living standard 
without deflation. Deflation in this context isn’t about productivity gains; it’s about de­
pleting wealth to pay for an unsustainable living standard.”
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ward mobility for the great majority living in the p eriphera l states. 
Should this layer disappear and  be reduced  to no m ore than a part 
o f the periphery, the world system is likely to becom e politically highly 
unstable.
Peripheralization o f the sem i-periphery would deprive the capi­
talist world-economy of a m ajor source o f effective dem and. M ore­
over, the periphera lized  sem i-peripheral states will inevitably face 
highly explosive political situations a t hom e. T he relatively m ore 
p ro letarian ized  w orking classes will dem and  sem i-peripheral levels 
o f wages and  political and  social rights. However, the peripheralized 
sem i-peripheral states will n o t be able to sim ultaneously offer the 
relatively h igh  wages and  survive the com petition  against o th er pe­
ripheral or peripheralized  sem i-peripheral states in  the world m ar­
ket. T he en tire  sem i-periphery will be th rea tened  with revolution and  
political turm oil.
T he th ird  scenario envisions upw ard convergence. C hina may 
succeed in its pursu it o f “m odern ization” and  becom e a secure, es­
tablished sem i-peripheral state. In  the m eantim e, the traditional semi­
periphera l states may succeed in m ain tain ing  their relative m onopoly 
in  certain  com m odity chains. As a result, Chinese wage rates converge 
upw ard toward sem i-peripheral levels. U nfortunately, this scenario 
is as dangerous for the capitalist world-economy as the second. The 
problem , again, lies with C hina’s huge size. Should Chinese workers 
generally receive sem i-peripheral levels o f wages, the total surplus 
distributed to the working classes in  the entire  semi-periphery would 
have to m ore than  double. This will greatly reduce the share o f the 
surplus available for the rest o f the world.
T he full im plications o f the th ird  scenario may be better u n d er­
stood after the fou rth  scenario is exam ined. If the scenario o f upw ard 
convergence turns o u t to be too expensive for the capitalist world- 
economy, what if C hina’s upw ard mobility takes place at the expense 
o f the traditional semi-periphery? In  o ther words, im agine a rise of 
C hina (and  India) that successfully displaces the trad itional semi­
periphery.
In  The Age of Transition, Im m anuel W allerstein p red icted  that in 
the com ing world econom ic expansion the “n o rth ” will continue to 
receive the bulk o f the global capital flows, and  in the “sou th” China 
and  Russia are likely to becom e priority areas for investment. H e asked 
the question: after all o f the investm ent is distributed, how m uch will
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be left for the o ther half of the globe? (W allerstein, 1996, 232). To 
be m ore consisten t with the curren tly  observed p a tte rn  of global 
capital flows, one only needs to replace Russia with Ind ia  and ask 
essentially the same question.
Some sim ple num erical exercises he lp  to illustrate the grave 
implications. Alternative num erical projections of the im pact of the 
“rise of C hina” are reported  in Tables 4 and 5.
Assume that betw een 2005 and 2025, the world econom y grows 
at an average annual rate of 3.5%. If during  the same period C hina 
m anages to grow at a rate of 7.5%, then  in 20 years C hina will be able 
to m ore than double its share of world output. If in 2005-2025 C hina’s 
share in world GDP (in term  of purchasing power parity) rises from 
14% to 30%, that m eans the share of the rest of the world has to fall 
by 16%.
If this decline is shared equally by the rest of the world, then  the 
rest of the world has to be con ten t with a sluggish annual growth rate 
of 2.4%. Since the low-income countries, with 40% of world popula-
TABLE 4
Numerical Projections of the Rise of China, 2005-2025 (1)
Average annual Share of world 
Countries growth rate of GDP GDP in 2025
1. W orld GDP annual growth rate = 3.5%, China's 2005 share = 4.5%, market 
value measure
China 7.5% 9.6%
Rest o f world 3.2% 90.4%
Implied growth rate o f per capita GDP, low income countries: 1.2%
2. W orld GDP annual growth rate = 3.5%, China's 2005 share = 14%, purchasing 
power parity (PPP) measure
China ' 7.5% 29.9%
Rest o f world 2.4% 70.1%
Implied growth rate o f per capita GDP, low income countries: 0.4%
3. W orld GDP annual growth rate = 4%, China's 2005 share = 14%, purchasing 
power parity (PPP) measure
China ' 7.5% 27.1%
Rest o f world 3.1% 72.9%
Implied growth rate o f per capita GDP, low income countries: 1.1%
N ote: T h e  ca lcu la tions assum e th a t all co u n trie s  in  the  “rest ol the  w orld” grow  at th e  sam e
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TABLE 5
Numerical Projections of the Rise of China, 2005-2025 (11)
Average annual Share of world 
Countries growth rate o f GDP GDP in 2025
1. W orld GDP annual growth rate = 3.5%, China’s 2005 share = 4.5%, high 
incom e countries’ share = 80%, m arket value measure
China 7.5% 9.6%
Rest o f world (excluding high income) 1.5% 10.4%
Implied growth rate o f per capita GDP, low incom e countries: 0.5%
2. W orld GDP annual growth rate = 3.5%, China’s 2005 share = 14%, high 
incom e countries’ share = 55%, purchasing power parity measure
China 7.5% 29.9%
Rest o f world (excluding high incom e) -0.2%  15.1%
Implied growth rate of per capita GDP, low incom e countries: -2.1 %
3. W orld GDP annual growth rate = 4%, China’s 2005 share = 14%, high income 
countries’ share = 55%, purchasing power parity measure
China * 7.5% 29.9%
Rest o f world (excluding high income) 1.2% 17.9%
Implied growth rate of per capita GDP, low incom e countries: -0.8%
Note: T h e s e  calculat ions  assum e th e  high in c o m e  co u n tr ie s  m a in ta in  t h e i r  sh a re  in world 
GD P t h r o u g h o u t  th e  p e r io d .
don  (C hina n o t included), have an  annual popu lation  growth rate 
o f about 2%, this implies that the growth rate o f per capita GDP for 
the low incom e countries would be a negligible 0.4%. F urther, for 
the poo rer m ajority o f the people in these countries, their real in­
comes m ost likely would fall as incom e inequalities within these coun­
tries continue to rise.
More realistically, one may assume that worldwide between-coun- 
try inequality continues to rise and the b u rd en  im posed by the “rise 
o f C hina” will be shared unequally. Suppose the core states m anage 
to m aintain  their cu rren t share in world ou tput. T ha t is, collectively, 
they will m anage to grow at the same rate as the world economy, 3.5%. 
If C hina's share increases from 14% to 30% and the share o f all low- 
and m iddle-incom e countries stays at 45%, then  the share of the rest 
o f the periphery and the semi-periphery declines from  31 % to 15%. 
This implies that their aggregate ou tp u t would fall at an  annual rate 
o f 0.2%, and their per capita GDP would decline a t an annual rate of 
2.1%. C onsidering that the en tire  popu lation  in some sub-Saharan
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African countries is being decim ated, sucli a devastating outcom e may 
n o t be entirely inconceivable.7
7. Towards Global Environmental Catastrophes?
It is widely agreed that the capitalist world-economy, with its cur­
ren t pa tte rn  o f developm ent, is environm entally unsustainable in the 
sense that it imposes increasingly severe bu rdens on  the biosphere 
and is likely to result in catastrophic consequences in the not-so-dis- 
tant future. For exam ple, the 2002 Environmental Sustainability Index 
concludes that “no  country can be said to be on  a sustainable envi­
ronm ental pa th .”8 W ackenragel, el al. (1999) show that in 1997, while 
the w orld’s biocapacity was 2.1 hectares per capita, the w orld’s “eco­
logical foo tp rin t” (the land and water area required  to sustain actual 
production , waste, and pollution) was 2.8 hectares per capita, imply­
ing unsustainable global depletion  o f natural resources.
The global environm ental crisis finds expression in a great vari­
ety o f u rg en t problem s such as global warm ing, destruction  o f the 
ozone layer, removal of tropical forests, e lim ination  of coral reefs, 
overfishing, extinction o f species, loss of genetic diversity, desertifi­
cation, shrinking water supplies, increasing toxicity of our environ­
m en t and food, and radioactive con tam ination  (Foster, 2002, 12).
W hat is the likelihood for the global environm ental crisis to be 
resolved w ithin the existing world system? Any a ttem pt to improve 
environm ental sustainability, w hether it is po llu tion  control, waste 
reduction, developm ent of renewable resources, m ore econom ic use 
o f non-renew able resources, or R&D associated with m ore sustain­
able technologies, necessarily involves additional costs for the system, 
so long as it requires some investm ent or the use o f some technology 
that otherwise would no t have been  undertaken  or developed. The 
costs may be directly im posed on  the capitalists as a result o f state 
regulation or indirectly imposed on the capitalists as a result o f h igher
7 29 m illion  HIV-positive p e o p le  now  live in  sub-S aharan  A irica. B otsw ana and  Z im babw e 
a rc  p re d ic te d  to lose h a ll oi th e ir  a d u lt p o p u la tio n  in  a d e c a d e  (B row n, 2003, 8 2 -8 6 ). 
N um erica l p ro jec tio n s tak ing  in to  acco u n t th e  im p ac t o i b o th  th e  “rise o i C h in a” an d  the  
“rise oi In d ia ” lead  to m o re  d isastrous results.
8 “Ail in itia tiv e  o i G lobal L eaders o i  T o m o rro w ,” E n v iro n m e n t Task Force, W orld  I co- 
n o m ic  F o ru m , A n n u a l M e etin g  2002, 2002 E nvironm ental Sustainability Index, “E x ecu­
tive S um m ary .”
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taxes required  to finance governm ent spending  on  “environm ental 
investm ent.”
The existing world system is a world econom y with m ultiple po­
litical structures (states). As a result, the system as a whole faces a 
classical “com m on property  p roblem ” o r “prisoners' d ilem m a.” Any 
individual state that undertakes environm ental adjustm ents suffers 
from  rising costs and places itself in a disadvantageous position against 
o th er states in world capital accum ulation. O n  the o th e r hand , “in­
ternational cooperation” is n o t enforceable and is n o t likely to suc­
ceed.9 To the ex ten t the core states have certain  m onopoly power in 
the world m arkets, they may be able to undertake some adjustm ents 
and shift a t least p a rt o f the costs on to  the p e rip h era l and semi­
peripheral states through unequal exchange. But this op tion  does no t 
ex istfo r the periphera l and sem i-peripheral states and therefore does 
n o t help  address global environm ental sustainability.
The capitalist world-economy is heavily d ep en d en t on  fossil fu­
els that are the prim ary source o f 87% of the world's energy. Fossil 
fuels are n o t renew able and eventually will be depleted . The world 
oil supply is likely to peak in  the period 2005-2015 and production  
may be down to half o f its peak level by 2025 (Trainer, 2001).
The use o f fossil fuels results in carbon dioxide and o th er green­
house gas emissions that con tribu te  to global warm ing. Even if the 
world succeeds in keeping carbon dioxide emissions a t 1990 levels, 
the carbon dioxide concen tration  in the atm osphere would double 
its pre-industrial level by the end o f this century, causing world aver­
age tem perature  to rise by 1 °C to 3.5°C, and to continue to rise for 
an o th er century before stabilizing (SDIS, 1999a). It would take Na­
ture m any m illions o f years to b ring  abou t tem pera tu re  change o f 
such a m agnitude. With the p ro jected  tem pera tu re  increase, the 
earth 's  env ironm ent will be radically transform ed, with cataclysmic 
results such as increased desertification, heavier rainfall and floods 
in  certain  areas, serious dam age to crops in the tropics and eventu­
ally in the tem perate areas as well, rising sea levels, and loss of spe­
cies and genetic diversity (Foster, 2002, 13-22; Brown, 2003, 59-79). 
To eventually stabilize carbon dioxide concentrations at double their 
pre-industrial levels, the global carbon dioxide emissions need to be
9 F o r the  la ilu re  oi th e  Kyoto P ro toco l, th e  in te rn a tio n a l a g re e m e n t to co n tro l g reen h o u se  
gas em issions, an d  the  lim its oi en v iro n m en ta l refo rm s w ith in  capitalism , see Foster', 2002.
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reduced  by 60% from  the 1990 levels (SDIS, 1999b; Foster, 2002, 20). 
M ore drastic cuts in emissions would be requ ired  if the goal is to sta­
bilize carbon dioxide concentrations a t close to pre-industrial levels.
In fact, world energy consum ption and  carbon dioxide emissions 
have been growing. Energy consum ption is growing at an annual rate 
o f 2%  and  is expected  to double  by 2050 and  q uad rup le  by 2100 
(Palfrem an, 2000). By 2010, global carbon dioxide emissions are 
projected  to have risen by 50% from  1990 levels (SDIS, 1999a).
To avoid global ecological disasters and  in anticipation o f deple­
tion o f fossil fuels, the world econom y has to shift from  one based on 
fossil fuels to one based on renew able energy sources in the not-so- 
d istant future. However, there is no known renew able source that is 
capable o f p roducing  the massive and  growing am ounts o f energy 
that the capitalist world-economy dem ands. W ind and solar energy 
sources are in te rm itten t and very small am ounts o f energy from  these 
sources can be gathered  per hectare  o f land. Relying on biomass for 
the w orld’s energy would use up all the land currently used in agri­
culture. If nuclear energy is to be relied  upon as the only source, the 
curren tknow n am ounts o f Uranium -235 would sustain the world only 
for 10 years (Palfrem an, 2000; Reuveny, 2002). As for the concep t of 
“hydrogen econom y,” it is n o t com m only understood  that hydrogen 
is n o t a source o f energy b u t a carrier o f energy, a form  into  which 
energy can be converted. Converting renewable energy sources into 
hydrogen and storing and transporting it involve form idable difficul­
ties, energy losses, infrastructure requirem ents, and  costs (Trainer, 
2003). T rainer estimates that renew able energy may be able to pro­
vide no m ore than one-th ird  o f the electricity and  one-quarter o f the 
liquid fuel energy currently used in Australia.
A hum an civilization based entirely on renewable energy sources 
is certainly possible. To prevent global warm ing and  environm ental 
catastrophes, instead of hop ing  in vain for some form  of magical tech­
nological change, the m ost straightforw ard and safest solution is to 
im m ediately stop and  reverse the worldwide processes o f capital ac­
cum ulation . If  w orld incom e and  w ealth d istribu tion  are radically 
equalized, there should be no technical difficulty in m eeting  the basic 
needs o f everyone on earth , even if world consum ption and produc­
tion are drastically reduced  to stabilize a t environm entally sustain­
able levels. But there  is simply no way for such a solution to arise ou t 
o f the laws o f m otion o f the existing world system.
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The “rise of China,” in the sense of China increasingly becom ing 
the cen ter of world capitalist industrial production, is likely to place 
increasingly greater pressures on the global environm ent. According 
to Lester R. Brown, D irector of the E arth  Policy Institute, “China is 
exceeding the carrying capacity of its ecosystems — overplowing its 
land, overgrazing its rangelands, overcutting its forests, overpum ping 
its aquifers” (Brown, 2003, 11). Desert expansion in China has been 
accelerating, now reaching 150 miles of Beijing. As water shortage and 
soil erosion becom e increasingly serious, C hina’s grain production has 
stagnated and will decline. Brown predicts that after C hina depletes 
its once huge stock of grain reserves, it will have to turn  to the world 
grain m arkets and drive up world food prices.
D uring the 1990s, C hina tu rned  from  a n e t exporter of oil in to  a 
n e t im porter. At the cu rren t rate, C hina is expected to im port over 
h a lf  of its oil consum ption  by 2020 and  over 80% by 2050 (Shao, 
2001). This is likely to have serious implications for n o t only the global 
env ironm en t b u t also global geopolitics. In  1996, C h ina’s carbon  
dioxide emissions stood a t 63% of the U. S. level. As the C hinese 
econom y keeps expanding  rapidly, it may soon overtake the U nited  
States as the w orld’s largest p ro d u ce r of carbon  dioxide emissions 
and  the leading con tribu to r to global warming.
8. Historical Possibilities in the 21st Century or the End o f History?
As Arrighi and  Silver discuss the possibility of a “China-centered 
civilization” leading the transform ation of the existing world system, 
they also po in t o u t that
since th e  m id-1980s, C h in a h a s b e e n  th e  key site o f in d u s tr ia l e x p a n sio n  an d  
new  w orking-class fo rm a tio n . G iven p a s t e x p e r ie n c e , we sh o u ld  e x p e c t a 
v igo rous w o rk e rs’ m o v e m en t to  e m erg e  in C h in a  as well. A n d  given th e  size 
a n d  cen tra lity  o f  C h in a  —  in th e  E ast A sian reg io n  a n d  globally  —  th e  tra ­
je c to ry  o f  th is m o v e m en t will have a  tre m e n d o u s  im p a c t on  th e  tra jecto ry  
o f  th e  tran s itio n  as a  w hole. (AS, 1999, 286.)
If the prediction turns o u t to be correct, w hat exactly will be the 
natu re  of this “vigorous w orkers’ m ovem ent”? Tt is very likely that the 
m ovem entw ill force a substantial redistribution of incom e and  wealth 
w ithin China. Further, given the argum ents p resen ted  in the previ­
ous sections, it is unlikely that, from  the po in t of view of capital and
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Llie elites, the redistribution can be com pensated fo r by upward m o­
bility within the world system. In this case, what now appears to many 
as the least likely outcom e —  a socialist-oriented workers’ revolution
— may em erge as the only viable solution.
W liat will h appen  next? O ne possibility is that the revolution will 
tu rn  inwards and  try to build  socialism in one country. T he histori­
cal experience  o f the 20th  century suggests that, u n d e r  persisten t 
military and  econom ic com petition  from  m ore pow erful capitalist 
states, and  excluded from  the possibility o f upward mobility, such an 
approach  is a recipe fo r eventual defeat.
T he o th e r possibility is that the revolution will lead to transfor­
m ation o f the world system.
By the mid-21st century, n o t only m ost o f the p roduction  of en­
ergy and  raw m aterials, b u t also m ost o f the m anufactu ring  indus­
tries, may be located in  the periphery  and  the semi-periphery. The 
concen tra tion  o f the bulk o f the m aterial p roduction  facilities and  
the organized working classes in the south may provide these coun­
tries with u n p receden ted  bargaining leverage against the north . Will 
working-class revolutions in the south m anage to effectively use this 
leverage, im posing a massive global red istribu tion  and  leading the 
transform ation  o f the world system from  a capitalist one based on 
uneq u a l exchange an d  large, m onopolistic  profits in to  a socialist 
world m arket econom y based on  p roduction  fo r use and  a m ore egali­
tarian exchange system?
Will the socialist w orld m arket econom y succeed in providing 
system-level solutions to the problem s left by capitalism ? Will the 
w orld m arket econom y allow its m em ber com m unities to be suffi­
ciently freed  from  the drive towards endless accum ulation  to deal 
successfully with the global environm ental crisis? O r, if it fails, will 
the resolution o f the global environm ental crisis eventually require 
the developm ent o f a world socialist governm ent?
Will the w orld’s incum bent hegem onic power — U. S. im perial­
ism — accom m odate these developm ents? If it tries to resist with all 
o f its weapons o f mass destruction, will hum anity prevail in its struggle 
against the m ost powerful, m ost destructive im perialism  the world 
has ever seen? O r will the struggle end  with the m utual destruction 
o f b o th  sides? Will hum anity, expecting the impossibility o f defeat­
ing  U. S. im perialism , choose to give in, an d  pave the way fo r the 
Am erican world empire?
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Will the end o f capitalist history tu rn  o u t to be the end o f all 
history? O r, as Marx p u t it in the Preface to A Contribution to the Cri­
tique of Political Economy, will it only bring  to a close the “prehistory of 
h um an  society”? (Marx, 1978, 5). All of these questions will have to 
be answered by real historical actions.
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A PPEN D IX : CLASS STR U C TU R ES TN T H E  USA, 
LATTN AM ERICA, AND C H IN A
T o  c o n s tru c t th e  class s tru c tu re  in th e  U n ite d  S tates, I rely  o n  th e  s tudy  by 
G ilb e rt a n d  Kahl (1992, 3 0 5 -3 2 4 ) a n d  W rig h t (1997, 9 1 -1 1 3 ). A b o u t th e  
w o rk in g  p o o r  a n d  th e  u n d erc lass , G ilb e rt a n d  Kahl (1992, 315 -3 1 6 ) m ake 
th e  fo llo w in g  c o m m e n ts : “T h ey  o sc illa te  in  in c o m e  f ro m  ju s t  above to 
below  th e  poverty  lin e , they  are  th re a te n e d  w ith p e rio d ic  u n em p lo y m e n t, 
o r  they  have n o  c h a n c e  to  w ork  a t  a ll.’’ A m ong  th e m , “th o se  w ho a re  sel­
d o m  em p lo y ed  a n d  a re  p o o r  m o st o f  th e  tim e fo rm  th e  u n d erc lass  in o u r  
society .’’ I co n s id e r  th e  su m  o f  th e  w o rk ing  p o o r  a n d  th e  u n d erc lass  as th e  
se m i-p ro le ta ria t in  U. S. society.
T h e  p ro le ta r ia t, if  narrow ly  d e fin e d , in c lu d es sk illed  w orkers a n d  sem i­
sk illed  w orkers , o r  a b o u t 30%  o f  th e  p o p u la tio n . A b ro a d  d e fin itio n  sh o u ld  
in c lu d e  all o f  th o se  w hose m o n ey  in co m es derive en tire ly  o r  a lm o st en tire ly  
f ro m  w age in co m es a n d  have relatively s tro n g  b a rg a in in g  pow er (with th e  
e x c ep tio n  o f  h igh ly  sk illed  p ro fe ssio n a l w orkers o ccu p y in g  stra teg ic  posi­
tio n s). A b ro a d  d efin itio n  o f  th e  p ro le ta r ia t m ay in c lu d e  n o t  on ly  sk illed  an d  
sem i-skilled w orkers, b u t  also supervisory  w orkers, low er m anagers , a n d  sem i­
p ro fe ss io n a l w orkers . T h is d e f in itio n  in c lu d e s  a b o u t 60%  p e r c e n t  o f  th e  
U. S. p o p u la tio n . I a d o p t a  m id d le  a p p ro a c h , c o n s id e rin g  th e  superv isory  
w orkers to  b e  a  p a r t  o f  th e  p ro le ta ria t. T h e  p ro le ta r ia t th e re fo re  acco u n ts  
fo r  45%  o f  th e  U. S. p o p u la tio n .
T h e  Fx'onomic Com m ission fo r Latin A m erica a n d  the C aribbean (ECI A C, 
1994) provides statistics reg a rd in g  class a n d  occupational s truc tu res in Latin 
A m erican coun tries. In Latin A m erica th e re  is a  large so-called “low productiv ­
ity’’ sector. W orkers in this secto r inc lude  w orkers in m icro -en terp rises (with
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few er th a n  five em p loyees), h o u se h o ld  em p lo y m en t, an d  ow n-accoun t an d  
u n p a id  family workers. In  m ost eases, th e  incom e o f  a “low productivity” w orker 
is n o t sufficient to  k eep  a fam ily o f  fo u r  above the  poverty line (ECI A C, 1994, 
25). I f  the  sem i-pro letariat includes m icro -en terp rise w orkers, ho u seh o ld  w ork­
ers, the  u rb a n  unem ployed , ru ra l workers, an d  w orkers in  en terp rises w ith m ore 
th a n  five em ployees an d  ow n-account an d  u n p a id  fam ily w orkers w ho receive 
a wage low er th a n  the  poverty line, th e n  in  A rgentina , Brazil, an d  C hile, the 
sem i-pro letariat accoun ts fo r  32, 47, an d  43%  o f the  p o p u la tio n , respectively. 
Assum e th e  m anageria l w orkers a m o u n t to  a b o u t o ne-th ird  o f  the  professional 
an d  techn ical w orkers; th e n  the  m idd le  class accounts fo r 14, 10, an d  15% o f 
th e  p o p u la tio n  o f  A rgentina , Brazil, an d  C hile, respectively. T h e  p ro le ta ria t 
accoun ts fo r  28, 18, an d  23% ; the  peasants ac co u n t fo r  7, 12, an d  15%; th e  
petty  bourgeoisie  accounts fo r  17 ,9 , an d  13%; an d  th e  capitalist class accounts 
fo r  4, 5, an d  2% , respectively.
In  1999-2001, a special research  g ro u p  o f  th e  C h inese  A cadem y o f  Social 
S ciences c o n d u c te d  re se a rc h  o n  “T h e  E v o lu tion  o f  th e  C o n te m p o ra ry  So­
cial S tru c tu re .” T h e  re se a rch  g ro u p  divides c o n te m p o ra ry  C h in ese  society 
in to  te n  m a jo r  social s tra ta , a c c o rd in g  to  th e ir  d if fe re n t access to  “o rg an iza ­
tiona l, e c o n o m ic , a n d  c u ltu ra l re so u rce s” (CASS, 2002). T h e  study  p rov ides 
in fo rm a tio n  th a t can  b e  u sed  to  c o n s tru c t C h in a ’s class s tru c tu re .
T h e  c a p ita lis t class in c lu d e s  th e  b u re a u c ra tic  a n d  p riv a te  cap ita lis ts  
(“sta te  a n d  social m a n a g e rs” a n d  “p rivate e n t re p re n e u r s ”). T h e  m id d le  class 
in c lu d es  m an ag e rs , p ro fe ssio n a l a n d  te ch n ic a l w orkers, a n d  h a lf  o f  th e  c leri­
cal w orkers. “A g ricu ltu ra l la b o re rs” a rc  co n s id e re d  to  be th e  peasan ts, an d  
th e  p e tty  b o u rg eo is ie  in c lu d es th e  self-em ployed.
T o ta l fo rm a l e m p lo y m e n t in c lu d es u rb a n  fo rm a l em p lo y m e n t ( th e  sum  
o f  th e  sta te , collective, an d  o th e r  e m p lo y m e n t in  th e  u rb a n  secto r) a n d  es­
tim a te d  ru ra l  n o n -p e a sa n t w age em p lo y m e n t. S u b tra c tin g  f ro m  th is  th e  
cap ita lists an d  th e  m id d le  class, w hat rem a in s  is co n s id e re d  to  be th e  p ro le ­
ta ria t. T h e  size o f  th e  sem i-p ro le ta ria t is derived  by su b trac tin g  p ro le ta r ia n  
w age w orkers fro m  to ta l w age w orkers ( in c lu d in g  “in d u s tria l w o rk ers” an d  
“sa lespersons a n d  service w o rk ers”).
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